Optimal Timing of Real Estate Investment under an Asymmetric Duopoly

This paper examines the sub-game equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. The relative strength of the firms is found to have significant impact on the firms’ equilibrium strategies. Preemptive strategies are critical if difference in strength between the two competing firms is relatively small. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the asymmetric duopoly model. The model, however, predicts that the two phenomena occur in earlier phases of market cycles, rather than in the state of depression. In a depressed market with high volatility, the leader and the follower will both choose the waiting strategies. Construction cascade is, therefore, not an expected phenomenon in a depressed market in the asymmetric duopoly framework. Please forward your comments to the second author at rststf@nus.edu.sg. Your comments are appreciated. The authors wish to thank Stephen Cauley, Walter Torous, an anonymous referee, and participants in the Singapore–Hong Kong Real Estate Research Symposium on 14–15 July 2005 for their constructive comments and suggestions.     

消费者品牌延伸评价中的"拥有者效应"

A two levels of product similarity times two levels of brand image consistency times three levels of ownerships factorial experiment was designed to explore the ownership effects when consumers evaluate brand extensions and judge parent brand after receiving brand extension information. Evidence shows that ownership effects do exist in both extension and parent brand evaluations. Brand image consistency is the most influential factor for parent brand owners while product similarity is more important factor for non-users in attitude formation towards the extension. The owners of competitive brands favor low image consistency extension more than high image consistency extension. Furthermore, there is an interaction effect between brand image consistency and product similarity for brand owners, whereas this effect is non-existent for non-owners and non-users. This again shows that brand owners care much more about brand image consistency than other consumer groups do. In evaluating a parent brand, owners and non-owners differ. The authors draw the conclusion that consumers’ brand extension evaluation is more like a “benefit oriented” process rather than a “pure affect transfer” process.     

On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration.     

Perfect option hedging for a large trader

Standard derivative pricing theory is based on the assumption of agents acting as price takers on the market for the underlying asset. We relax this hypothesis and study if and how a large agent whose trades move prices can replicate the payoff of a derivative security. Our analysis extends prior work of Jarrow to economies with continuous security trading. We characterize the solution to the hedge problem in terms of a nonlinear partial differential equation and provide results on existence and uniqueness of this equation. Simulations are used to compare the hedging strategies in our model to standard Black-Scholes strategies.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

Subprime Crisis Damages China''''s Textile Exports

As the effects of the subprime crisis in the U.S.continue to grow and spread across the World.     

发达地区政府投资对民间投资的影响分析——以浙江省为例

本文以浙江省为例，利用浙江改革开放后30年的数据资料，对发达地区政府投资和民间投资进行协整建模分析，分析结果表明，发达地区政府投资和民间投资之间存在惟一的长期稳定的均衡关系，从长期来看政府投资对于民间投资具有正向的促进作用。脉冲响应分析的结果表明，无论是从短期还是长期来看，政府投资对民间投资都有正向的挤入效应，不过这种挤入效应较弱。     

中国城市服务业区域间溢出效应与反馈效应分析

本文首先通过区域间投入产出表，分析了中国东北、东部、中部、西北和西南五大地区服务业的溢出效应，然后通过两区域投出产出模型衡量服务业地区间的和地区内部相互的反馈效应。研究发现：东部地区是区域间经济交流的最大收益者，所受到的溢出效应最大；而西北地区是最小收益者，所受到的溢出效应最小；沿海地区区域内的服务业联系要强于内地；内地对沿海的服务业外溢效应要远远高于沿海对内地的；与内陆相比，沿海地区服务业的发展更容易受到外界影响，同时商业运输业比其它服务业的外向性特征更加突出；服务业的各种效应程度小于工业，而大于农业。     

Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment*

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantity‐setting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well‐known tension between the fixed set‐up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and exports.     

中小企业融资中的信贷配给分析

中国中小企业在国民经济中占据了半壁江山,对中国的国民经济和社会发展起到了举足轻重的作用,然而目前中小企业中的融资问题已成为阻碍中小企业发展的主要因素。银行是中小企业间接融资最愿意采取的融资渠道,但是大量中小企业的信贷需求却只有少数部分可以得到满足,即中小企业成为银行“信贷配给”的主要牺牲品。本文试图通过信息不对称理论,利用Stiglitz和Weiss的“信贷配给模型”框架来分析银行对中小企业惜贷的内在原因,并提出了相关的政策建议。